Forty-eight hours before the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, the then Spanish Secretary of State for the EU, Méndez de Vigo, appeared on the BBC. During his interview, he rejected the claims of the then Scottish First Minister, Alex Salmond, according to which an independent Scotland could negotiate membership ‘from within’ the EU. Instead, he argued that Scotland would have had to follow the ‘normal‘ accession process provided by Article 49 TEU, casting doubt on whether Spain would ever consent to it. The issues highlighted in this largely forgotten interview are not unique to that moment in time. A couple of years ago, the Scottish Government announced their strategy for securing a referendum that may lead to an independent Scotland in the EU. The debate on the constitutional future and European prospect of Northern Ireland has intensified after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. In Catalonia, the parties that support independence remain in power and hope to organise a legal referendum after they have secured (?) a deal with the Spanish Government on an amnesty law (that provides for the complete exculpation of all penal, administrative, or accountable crimes to those indicted after the referendums on Catalan independence of 2014 and 2017) while Cyprus is sleepwalking towards a de jure partition. Postcards from Bolzano where part of this paper was written The questions arisen in the context of all those constitutional conflicts shed light on the intricate relationship between secession and the EU constitutional order. For within the EU multi-level constitutional order of States, ‘the voluntary withdrawal of a political territory from a larger one in which it was previously incorporated may also be seen as a move to change the status or affiliation of a territory within a wider constellation of polities.’ In the case of internal secession (ie. when a region is carved out of an existing one and given distinctive substate status within a federal or quasi-federal State), a newly formed substate entity within a territorially plural EU Member State would be able to effectively use the channels of regional participation in the Union policy-making processes both at the national and at the EU levels. As to external secession (ie.  when a subunit of a state breaks off, usually to form a new state, but sometimes to join an existing neighbour), its proponents, such as the mainstream Catalan and Flemish independentist parties, prioritise the ‘upgrade’ of their region from a subnational authority to a fully functional Member State within the EU legal order, enjoying all relevant rights and obligations. Finally, the withdrawal of a whole Member State from the EU, such as in the case of Brexit, inescapably leads to the recalibration of its relations with the EU and its remaining Member States. A podcast with Dr R Gulati about my paper Overall, secession within the EU,  triggers the repositioning of the relevant subject of EU law within the European constitutional landscape. This is why there has always been a question about how the EU may treat such constitutional events. For instance, Weiler has famously suggested that the EU should not and/or would not admit independent States that have been created even out of consensual and democratic secession as members. Instead, the Union should wish them ‘Bon Voyage in their separatist destiny’. Contrary to this view, in my new article, I argue  that provided that secessionist processes (at any level of the multi-level constitutional order) are in conformity with the foundational values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU, the EU legal order is flexible enough to accommodate them. Such accommodating and flexible approach to secessionist processes that the paper suggests is dictated by three fundamental aspects of the EU constitutional order of States. First is the composite, intertwined and multi-level character of the European constitution. Article 4(2) TEU provides that the ‘Union shall respect … Member States’ national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government.’ Also, the Union ‘shall respect [Member States’] essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State.’ This means that the starting point of how the EU accommodates secessionist processes that take place at any tier of the multi-level order is and should be the respect to the relevant Member State’s position, as Peers has argued. So, if there is a consensual and democratic secession, it should be accommodated by the Union. Second, the EU as a subject of international law has committed itself to ‘the strict observance and the development of international law.’ This is particularly relevant as a (consensual) secession is a legitimate expression of the right to self-determination. So, overall, an approach that accommodates secessionist processes that do not breach Article 2 TEU is also compatible with and respectful of the international law on the right to self-determination. Third, such deference is also in conformity with the EU’s raison d'être as a peace plan. Rather than actively fighting to eradicate nationalism, the EU, since its inception, has provided for a pragmatic legal, political and economic framework where competing nationalisms co-exist and even cooperate. It has designed political and legal institutions in which the competing nationalisms can continue to be negotiated. It is precisely the historical success of this pragmatic framework that transformed foes of the past such as France and Germany to reliable partners of today. In that sense, an emphasis on the procedural requirements of consensual secession and the subsequent normalisation of the relations with the Union can have transformative effects on those constitutional conflicts as it may contribute to the lessening of the frictions, tensions and fissures that those processes unavoidably create. By adopting such an approach, the EU may incentivise self-determination movements to adopt methods, which are compatible with the Article 2 TEU foundational values instead of engaging in an endless, paralysing political and constitutional tug of war. Archive March 2024 Mar 6, 2024 Secession in the EU multi-level constitutional order Mar 6, 2024 June 2023 Jun 30, 2023 Alexis Tsipras, Nanni Moretti and the future of the Greek Left Jun 30, 2023 June 2022 Jun 30, 2022 Scottish Indyref 2: Towards Another Constitutional Crisis Jun 30, 2022 Jun 15, 2022 The Northern Ireland Protocol Bill: How did we end up here? Jun 15, 2022 May 2022 May 19, 2022 The Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: The Current Stalemate May 19, 2022 April 2021 Apr 28, 2021 2 Articles on the Cyprus issue negotiations. Apr 28, 2021 February 2021 Feb 5, 2021 The Right of Self-Determination in the EU constitutional order. Feb 5, 2021 September 2020 Sep 18, 2020 Competing claims and narratives in Eastern Mediterranean Sep 18, 2020 Sep 10, 2020 In the name of peace and integrity? UK Government's breach of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland Sep 10, 2020 October 2019 Oct 22, 2019 A ‘Cracking Deal’ for the Union? Oct 22, 2019 Oct 18, 2019 Whatever Happened to the Backstop Oct 18, 2019 Oct 17, 2019 What To Expect (From the EU Council) When You Are Expecting A Brexit Deal Oct 17, 2019 Oct 3, 2019 Boris Johnson’s Alternative to the Backstop Oct 3, 2019 August 2019 Aug 23, 2019 Interview with DW Aug 23, 2019 April 2019 Apr 12, 2019 Extending Brexit: Reaching the Larry David Moment of the Saga Apr 12, 2019 Apr 3, 2019 Brexit as a secession Apr 3, 2019 Apr 1, 2019 Holding European Parliament Elections in Northern Ireland after Brexit Apr 1, 2019 March 2019 Mar 29, 2019 ‘Our Precious Union’: The Backstop and the Constitutional Integrity of the UK Mar 29, 2019 Mar 18, 2019 The UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus: The other Brexit land boundary Mar 18, 2019 February 2019 Feb 7, 2019 Why a frontstop cannot replace the backstop. A Modest Reply to Professor JHH Weiler. Feb 7, 2019 January 2019 Jan 22, 2019 Macedonia name issue: Agreement and disagreement Jan 22, 2019 December 2018 Dec 12, 2018 Breaking Up is Hard to Do Dec 12, 2018 November 2018 Nov 28, 2018 "Everything must change so that everything can stay the same.": The Effect of Brexit on the Union Nov 28, 2018 October 2018 Oct 17, 2018 Backstop, Backstop, Backstop... Oct 17, 2018 July 2018 Jul 9, 2018 The 'Chequers' Agreement That Wasn't Jul 9, 2018 June 2018 Jun 14, 2018 What’s in a name? Jun 14, 2018 Jun 8, 2018 A Tale of two 'Backstop' Options Jun 8, 2018 May 2018 May 15, 2018 A Special Arrangement for Northern Ireland? May 15, 2018 April 2018 Apr 12, 2018 A Bull in a China Shop: Brexit as a Challenge to the Good Friday Agreement Apr 12, 2018 March 2018 Mar 6, 2018 Why the EU’s ‘backstop option’ for Northern Ireland doesn’t threaten the UK’s constitutional integrity Mar 6, 2018 December 2017 Dec 13, 2017 The case for a differentiated Brexit Dec 13, 2017 Dec 11, 2017 What’s in an Irish Border? Dec 11, 2017 November 2017 Nov 17, 2017 How can Scotland and Northern Ireland remain in the EU without seceding from the UK? Nov 17, 2017 October 2017 Oct 6, 2017 Homage to Catalonia Oct 6, 2017 August 2017 Aug 18, 2017 Footnotes in Ireland Aug 18, 2017 July 2017 Jul 13, 2017 No Country for Reluctant Peacemakers Jul 13, 2017 June 2017 Jun 28, 2017 Conference on Cyprus: Foot-dragging Towards a Dead-End Jun 28, 2017 Jun 20, 2017 May is the cruelest month Jun 20, 2017 April 2017 Apr 4, 2017 Brexit has Opened a Can of (Constitutional) Worms Apr 4, 2017 March 2017 Mar 31, 2017 Short guide to the EU Guidelines for the Brexit Negotiations Mar 31, 2017 Mar 29, 2017 Brexit o’ clock: The State of the Union Mar 29, 2017 Mar 28, 2017 Reunifying Ireland: An EU law perspective Mar 28, 2017 February 2017 Feb 28, 2017 Limiting the constitutional space of Scotland and Northern Ireland Feb 28, 2017 January 2017 Jan 26, 2017 The future of the UK: A legal perspective Jan 26, 2017 Jan 24, 2017 A short comment on Miller Jan 24, 2017 December 2016 Dec 22, 2016 From Greenland to Svalbard: Scotland’s quest for a differentiated Brexit Dec 22, 2016 Dec 8, 2016 The Colour of Brexit Dec 8, 2016 November 2016 Nov 28, 2016 The Cyprus Conundrum Nov 28, 2016 Nov 23, 2016 Sturgeon, Puigdemont and the Constitutional Taboo of Secession Nov 23, 2016 Nov 16, 2016 Guest Post: Cyprus is Waiting for a New Reunification Plan. Again... Nov 16, 2016 Nov 14, 2016 The Birth of a Republic but not of a Nation: Understanding the inherent paradox of post-conflict constitution-making Nov 14, 2016 October 2016 Oct 5, 2016 Guest Post: You Can Check Out Any Time You Like, But Can You Really Leave? On ‘Brexit’ And Leaving International Organizations Oct 5, 2016 Oct 3, 2016 How can the devolved administrations be included in the Government’s Brexit negotiations? Oct 3, 2016 August 2016 Aug 2, 2016 Can Scotland and Northern Ireland Remain in the EU? Aug 2, 2016 Aug 2, 2016 Scotland's and Northern Ireland's Choice: How could they remain in the EU? Aug 2, 2016 Aug 2, 2016 Brexit - secession and the UK’s ongoing position with the EU Aug 2, 2016 Aug 2, 2016 On Article 50 TEU Aug 2, 2016 Aug 2, 2016 The unbearable toxicity of referendum campaigns Aug 2, 2016 Aug 2, 2016 The Day after the Referendum Before: Possible Alternatives to EU Membership Aug 2, 2016 Aug 2, 2016 Football and Nationalism Aug 2, 2016 Aug 2, 2016 A view from the fence Aug 2, 2016 Aug 2, 2016 4+1 Comments on the Greek referendum Aug 2, 2016 Aug 2, 2016 Media Coverage of the Greek Referendum Aug 2, 2016 Aug 2, 2016 In Greek: Πώς είναι ένας αριστερός Πρωθυπουργός; Aug 2, 2016 Aug 2, 2016 In Greek: "Το "ερυθρόλευκο ποτάμι" Aug 2, 2016 Aug 2, 2016 Cyprus's Groundhog Day Aug 2, 2016 Aug 2, 2016 In Greek: Το δίκιο (του άλλου) είναι ζόρικο πολύ Aug 2, 2016 Aug 2, 2016 In Greek: Το Συνταγματικό Τόξο και η ΕΡΤ Aug 2, 2016 Aug 2, 2016 In Greek: 5+1 σύντομες σκέψεις για την κρίση στην Κύπρο Aug 2, 2016

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