Border Poll Reality Check: Demographics, Data, and Decades of Debate (Part Three)

4 weeks ago 24

Is a United Ireland inevitable, or is the status quo strengthening? This final installment of our University of Liverpool survey series tackles the Border Poll head-on. While support for unity has risen since 2017, recent data reveals a slight decline and a sobering demographic shift: a shrinking youth electorate. With 59.4% of decided voters favoring the UK, we explore why the “50+1” threshold remains a significant, and perhaps growing, challenge for pro-unity campaigners. We have been testing the border polls ... Read more...

Is a United Ireland inevitable, or is the status quo strengthening? This final installment of our University of Liverpool survey series tackles the Border Poll head-on. While support for unity has risen since 2017, recent data reveals a slight decline and a sobering demographic shift: a shrinking youth electorate. With 59.4% of decided voters favoring the UK, we explore why the “50+1” threshold remains a significant, and perhaps growing, challenge for pro-unity campaigners.

We have been testing the border polls question for decades. It is impossible to deny two things. The low point for pro-unity was the collapse of the Celtic Tiger in 2008 and the rising point for it the idiocy of Brexit. Two realities that highlight issues or moments as influence more than debate, persuasion and changing affiliation.

University of Liverpool surveys since 2017 have evidenced a 5.6% rise in support for a united Ireland tomorrow. However, between 2024 and 2025 there has been a small decline in support for Irish unity by 1.2%.

Support is highest among the younger age group of 18–34-year-olds (47.3%) compared to the age groups 35-59 (34.7%) and 60+ (17%). But we must acknowledge that due to a declining birthrate the electoral weight of those joining the electorate is declining. Between 1983 and 1992 the numbers who reached the age of eighteen and who joined the electorate was around 316339. By 2033-2042 that will have decreased to 219743 or by 30.5%. In the 2040s it could have halved compared to 1983-1992.

As usually found, those who wish to remain in the UK include most Protestants and the plurality of those who are neither unionist nor nationalist or of no-faith. Pro-unity is significantly defined as Catholic and gains less support from neithers, the non-religious and those of other faiths.

A fundamental problem is that the pro-unity parties need to gain a very significant growth in their vote share to take them towards 50+1%. Regarding the 2022 Assembly election there were 862703 votes. Nationalism/republicanism would have required 431,352 votes to gain 50+1%. In 2027, with c20% of those intending to vote for non-constitutional parties, that would mean gaining 62.5% of the constitutional vote to hit 50+1.

As the Secretary of State explained to David on the 4th December:

‘… there is one criterion there are not criteria and what the Good Friday Agreement said is that if in the view of the Secretary of State that in the event of a poll the majority of people in Northern Ireland would vote for constitutional change then he or she shall hold one ….it’s a long way off because no one who is calling for a border poll can actually argue that the condition is currently met in Northern Ireland. There is nothing you can point to that says the majority of people in Northern Ireland are in favour of constitutional change’.

Among those who express an opinion, within this survey, 59.4% v 40.6% favour remaining within the UK. When including the 20% who are undecided/do not know how they would vote in a border poll 47.3% wish to remain in the UK compared to 33.2% who wish to leave.

When examined by party political support and constitutional issues the following.

  • Party support remains as found before in more recent University of Liverpool surveys.  The exception is the Greens who have become more pro-unity, in terms of voters, than previous surveys.
  • A significant share of SDLP voters remain undecided or would vote to remain in the UK (20.3%)
  • Alliance maintains a plurality of voters who are pro-UK (48% v 27.3%).
  • SF, Alliance Greens and SDLP have the highest shares who are undecided or do not know how they would vote tomorrow in a border poll (Figure 3).
  • Unionist voters are more committed constitutionally[1].

In term of identity 1 in 10 nationalists would vote to remain in the UK compared to 8.4% of unionists.  We find that the plurality of those who are neither unionist nor nationalist (40.9% v 23.2%) are pro-union. The neither unionist nor nationalist group have around a third who are undecided compared to 12.8% of nationalists and 4.5% of unionists.

Behind the data is a sobering reality for pro-union and pro-unity. For pro-unity parties we find that more respondents who would vote for a united Ireland or who are undecided/do not know how they would vote are more likely to consider remaining in Northern Ireland if certain conditions were met compared to the share who would vote to remain in the UK who would accept constitutional change if those conditions were met in the Republic.

A main factor in changing the pro-unity mind is if pro-union parties showed respect for Irish culture something that may lose them traditional voters if they did but also something with a changing demography they need to do. SF and the SDLP need to hope the now patently obvious cost of living crisis in the Republic does not deepen. If this were an end of term report then pro-unity and pro-union would not gain merit regarding either shoring up the union or leading to its demise.


[1] Expressed as a graph.

[2] On-going consultation for Civic Space 2 project.


[3] Table: Vote share constitutional question

Irish Unity Undecided/Do Not Know Remain UK
TUV 4 5.6 90.4
UUP 8.2 8.5 83.5
DUP 11.5 8.1 80.4
Alliance 27.3 24.7 48
Greens 50 20.3 29.7
SDLP 54 25.6 20.3
SF 76.3 15.2 7.5

 


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